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REAL, ESTATE
NEW YORK, MARCH 4, 1916
WHY WE DO NOT HAVE HOME RULE
Same Principles Should Apply to City and State
As Govern Between State and Federal Authorities
By Dr, FREDERICK A. CLEVELAND, Director, Bureau of Municipal Research
WHILE there are certain points of
the local administrative and finan¬
cial problem in which Mayor Mitchel's
demand for home rule centers, it may be
of value to give a wider perspective to
the issue.
Fundamentally, the struggle for home
rule has in it nothing new. It carries
with it an issue over which men have
disputed for centuries—the question as
to where the jurisdiction of the State
shall end and the jurisdiction of the
city or other local government shall be¬
gin. This was a factor in the politics
of the Roman Empire, in the middle-
age-adjustments with feudalism, in the
struggles for constitutional government
in England. The best that can be hoped
for is that as much of self government
will be left to the citizens of each lo¬
cality as is compatible with the pur¬
poses of the broader establishment. In
making decision as to where the line of
authority shall be drawn, exactly the
same principles should govern as be¬
tween State and Federal authority—viz:
each jurisdiction should do the things it
is best fitted to do with as little inter¬
ference as possible. Subject to the more
general principle of unity of parts, each
should do the things that primarily af¬
fect its own constituency.
The Home-Rule Principle.
Services, like diplomacy, national de¬
fense, regulation of commerce, that af¬
fect the welfare of the nation as a whole,
together with those activities which are.
general in application and which cannot
with equal advantage be administered by
state governments, should be adminis-
teied by the federal agency; those ac¬
tivities which are general in character
but which can best be administered by
states should be so conducted; the func¬
tions and activities that have to do with
the well being of local communities
should be lett to local government—the
.State retaining only such an overlordship
aj will contribute to good administration.
This is an ideal which has been de-
parteil from. In this State and other
States, legislation having to do with cities
and other local governing units has not
infrequently turned on quite another
point. It is not because anyone thinks
that the question as to what salaries New
Yorlc City pays its teachers is primarily
a State-wide matter that we have State
legislation on the subject. It is not be¬
cause the Legislature at Albany is better
qualified or is more closely in touch with
the police problem of New York, with
the l(>cal street cleaning problem or the
local fire fighting problem, that men
run to Albany for legislation.
What is usually overlooked is the fact
that the demand for legislation which in¬
terferes with the principle of home rule
originates in the locality affected. The
reasons for this local demand relate to
one or the other or both of two assump¬
tions: (1) either that the local authorities
cannot be trusted. (2) or that the legis¬
lative is a more favorable instrument for
the protection of special interests. The
first assumption is a fundamental defect
in all our political thinking—it is reflected
in all our constitutions and charters. It
lias been made, however, in what has
been conceived to be the interest of com¬
mon weliare—is a result of patriotic im-
DR. FREDERICK A. CLEVELAND.
pulse. The second assumption, on the
other hand, is selfish and unpatriotic—
an outgrowth of local organization for
spoils.
Let us consider first the assumption
that the local authorities cannot be
trusted. This is inherent in the thinking
of the American people. They distrust
all authoiity; they distrust everybody
and everything connected with author¬
ity; they even distrust their own electo¬
rate. Our government was conceived
in distrust —and to this end our con¬
stitutions and charters are looked to to
prevent those in authority from doing
harm.
Distrust of Public Officers.
This observation is not made to de¬
tract from the value of those great char¬
ters which were worked out by our fore¬
fathers. But their title to renown lies
in the protection which they have af¬
forded to the liberties of the people. As
charters of liberty, American charters
and constitutions are among the world's
masterpieces of political thought; as
charters of incorporation for doing busi¬
ness (the business of the people), they
are among the world's greatest failures.
And they are failures for the reason that
popular distrust of government caused
our constitution makers to seek pro¬
tection in the emasculation of author¬
ity—in putting limitations on the exer¬
cise of powers, instead of giving to offi¬
cers the powers needed to make them
effective public servants and at the same
time adopting devices to make them re-
sponsible and responsive to the will of
the people
This is the thing that distinguishes our
political development from the political
development of England, France and
other countries which have responsible
governments. Up to the tiine of the
American Revolution, English govern¬
ment was not responsive and responsible;
that was the reason for our revolt. We
sought to proiect our liberties first by
revolution, then by a process of emascu¬
lation; they have also had their revolts,
but these have been followed by devel¬
oping methods of effective popular con¬
trol without emasculation. And as pop¬
ular control has been made more effec¬
tive, as confidence has grown, the powers
and functions of the government itself
have been increased.
Observe how these two systems have
worked out in local as well as in state
government. To the very extent that
control over the government has been
perfected, to the extent that the govern¬
ment was made responsive and respon¬
sible, the people came to trust their exe¬
cutives and legislatures. Under a sys¬
tem of effective popular control only
such men could continue in office as were
trusted by a majority. The result has
been, the government had the means of
knowing at all timts where a majority
stood on every question; and the people
could force the retirement of officers who
did not have a majority back of them.
The reaction has been one of mutual
trust. Our ofiicers, on the other hand,
have had no way of knowing whether a
majority is back of them on any meas¬
ure while it is under discussion; the peo¬
ple have had no way of enforcing re¬
sponsibility and making the government
responsive. In America there has been
a growing distrust, a growing discon¬
tent. An administration is seated by a
majority, then there is a cumulation ol
dissatisfaction and distrust until the end
of a fixed term, say four years, when the
thing to be expected happens: the elec¬
torate "turns the rascals out."
Appeals to State for Protection.
Since tliere is no provision made for
keeping the government and public opin¬
ion in adjustment—no way of enforcing
the opinions of a majority on officers—
increasing distrust has caused the people
to go to the State capitol to get measures
adopted which will operate to take away
from local officers powers which they
alone should exercise. Thus the balance
between local and State governments is
destroyed. Home rule is sacrificed on
the altar of popular discontent—the re¬
sult of a plan of political organization
tliat does not provide for responsible ad¬
ministration under adequate popular con¬
trol.
The fact of popular discontent with
local authorities and of the irresponsi¬
bility and irresponsiveness of State offi¬
cers give to the special interests their
opportunity. This accounts for the suc¬
cess of the lobby which is maintained
at the State capital to get measures
throu.gh that will give to the promoters
their advantage at the expense of the
local community.
Some of the evils of the system may
be mitigated by the vigilance and the
organized efforts of local officers, but so
long as the people seek protection by
emasculation of the government itself—â–
by refusing to give to officers the powers
which are necessary to efficient admin¬
istration—any effort to obtain home rule
can do little more than give temporary
relief.
How can the people be expected to be
satisfied with the results obtained by
an administration organized as has been
that of New York City? The first proc¬
ess was gradually to limit and hamper
the mayor, and to deprive him of powers