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Real estate record and builders' guide: v. 60, no. 1539: September 11, 1897

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September ii, 1897. ' Record and Guide 351 ,________»g/«w;ite»i^iS8a.^ ■ .BiftnfcssjutoTHErøiiorGîIW.Íí'í^li PRICE PER YEAR IN ADVANCE, SIX DOLLaRS. ...... Piiblished every Saturduy, TtC).£FHONB. .... CORTLANDT 1370. Coiumunlcations shoulâ he addressed to C. "W. SWEET, 14-16 Vesey Street. J. 2, LINDSEY, Buaimas Manager. 'Entertd al Ihe Posl-Office at Neiv York, N. Y., as second'Class maller." VOL. LX tíEPTEMBER 11. 1897. NO. 1,539 SPECULATION still beeps its hold upon the moneyeíĩ pub- lic, and, wbatever may be the opinĩon of the eautious, there is no sign of the buying power giving out. Purehases of both stoclîs and 'bonds eontinue to be made in remarkable vol- ume, creating conditions vei-y lilie those that existed abroad ou the recovery from the panie of 1893, and whĩch continued for aboot two years. With the return of oonfidence and aided by eheap and pleutiful money, everythiug advanced iu price. Con- sôls continued to advance eveu after the Directors of the Bani; oí England annouuced tliat the price niade them undesirable purehases for the banli. Speculatiou in Kaflirs hecame rara- pant, notwithstandiug the coutinued protestations and waruings of thG flnancial press, fnlly justifled later on wben the outsider looked for the marlîet on whieb to talîe his paper proflts, and thG banks, alarmed by tbe extent of the rise, refused to loan raoney on the shares. There was reason in the advance of the iĸnues retupniug income; with money, easily ttorrowable on íime at 2 per cent., ît was good business to buy seouritĩes paying any- thing above that rate, because the escess alĩ went to make a substantial return on tbe margin put up by the operator, pro- vided prices were maintained to the maturty of the loan. lu the event of their having advanced in the interval, of course, the proflt was greater, There were really two ehauees for proflt against one for loss. In tlie same way the mauy securities tbat were selliug iu our market to return from, say 4 to 5 and 5^ per cent., wbich had merit, offered excellent opportunities for suecessful trading witb time money at from 2 to 3 per cent. Sucb operations, bowever, bring about a gradual simultaneous advanee iu iboth the quotatlons for securĩties aud iu money, so that they cease to be profitable aud are of course discontinued. Thís result was produeed in London some time ago, by the in- vestment value of even second aud third rate issues becoming too high to uet anything but a very small returu, and in loans to do littie more than caiTyiug themselves. Tbe opportunities for coutinuiug operations of this uature will not be exhausted ĩn our marlîet until the rate for time money and the return on aeceptable securities draw nearer togetber than they are now. This gives a rational exeuse for the continued advance of in- come beariug issues, but does not esplain the corresponding ad- vance in the cats and dogs. That is explained by tbe oceult lerm "sympatby," and tbe explanation leaves us somewhat in a fog. Really they advance through the iguorance and want of judgraent of the speculator, wbo will buy a cheap stock to-day beeause it was dearer yesterday, or beeause a high-priced stoek of to-day could have been bought a quarter of a century ago in the units, if not in tbe fractions; also becausea little money wiU cover a eonsiderable amount of such issues, and a rise of one point is proportionately ten times iiiore to a stock selling at 10 than it is to one selling at 100—and finally becauae soeeulation is epidemie and the victim probably cannot help bimself. Tbis is tbe way a booming stock market is made, aud tbe very un- reasonableness of the thing prevenls auy estimate being raade of its prohable extent or duration. BRITISH flnaneial journals continue to discuss the silver questiou as ereated by the proposals submitted to the government by tbe representatives of the United States and Prance—tbe nature of wbicb by the by is stiU only guessed at— and by the rise in the value of the rupee under tlie purcbases of ezchange by the India Council. Uutil It is known what the pro- posals previously referred to are, it is useless to discuss thera, Gspeeially as the British Goverument wiU soon reply to tbera in aceordance witb the promise raade some time ago. As to tbe Indlan situation, the influence of tbe decline of silver and the growlng seareity of the rupee upon the Bastern trade cannot but be baneful, so that, if the govenimGnt is not inellned to take up the matter of the stabilĩtatlon of silverby intematloaalaetlon. publle opinion will eompei it to provide a better forra of cur- rency for ĩndia than the one so unquestionably undesirable that the country now bas. Pendiug tbe consideration that a raatter of this Iraportance would require, it is not uulikely that tbe In- diau miut will be opened again, even if only temporarily, to re- lieve tbe stringency that is likely to arise as the result of four yoîH-s' curtailment of coiuage, aud of tbe fluancial depressioa from whicb tbe couutry is uow sufteriug, and is likely to suffer for some tirae. Another matter of absorbing interest across the water is the deraand for gold, The provísional arrangeraents luade by the Imperial bauU of Russia to pay out gold have beeu .^io well received that the goveruraent is eneouraged to adopt, as soon as is practically possible, the gold basis for the Erapire. A coramission of experts is now making a tour of Burope lo gather iuformation to assist this work. Consequently, Russia, as well as Austria and ,ĩapau, is steadily absorbing gold, tbougb wltb as little disturbauee to the raarket as possible. Tbe fear exists that the United States will also take gold trom Burope, an event whicb would assuredly raise diseouut rates. So far this fear has been unfounded, or means have beeu taken, eitber by the sale of American seeurities, or borrowings in tbe New York market, to keep at least tbe nomiuai 'balauce of transac- tions in favor of Europe. If there is an actual balance in favor of tbis country, tbe expected demaud for uioney here for spec- ulative and iudusírial operations, with its cousequeut increase in rates, wiU expose it. However, the faet tbat w-eek after week the Bank of Eugland's rate of discount remaius uncbanged shows that there is uo iiuraediate danger of this taking place. Even if the United States sbould deiuand gold, it may he re- marked, it would require that tlie other eouutries tbat are now taking that metal continue their demands in order to materially cbange the present conditions of ĩhe raarket. These demands bavG hitherto been so judiciously raade tbat it is iuferable tbat they would be suspended if tlieir continuatiou tlu-eatens embar- rassraent. HE approaching muuicipal elGction is of especial interest to ■i- owners of real estate; indeed, for tbein, it is a more im- portant election tban auy that bas occurred iu the lifetirae of the present generation. Greater New York is not only a stupeudous experiment, every element of which is surrouuaed by uucer- tainty; but the paper plan, upou whicb tbe goverumeut of the larger city îs to be based, is so loose aud indefiuite tbat it is ĩra- possible to say how any part of it wiil work or what depend- ence may be put upou it to secure a proper adniiuistríitiou of tbe city's business. The only safeguard opeu to the citiĸeu is to elect raen for the new offlces of i-eal capacity for their work and of high character. Tbe worst afflictiou we can suffer wiU be a partisan administratiou. It will shape tbe entire govern- ment of the new city to party ends, aud the cousequenees of sucb misdirection will not be sligbt, In every eity„ of course, every interest is concerned iu the cbai'acter of the raunicpal government; but everywhere real estate is in partieularly elose toucb with the adraiuistratiou, and iu New York City peeuliarly so. In the first place, reai estate to-day pays at tlie outset the greater portlon of the eity taxes, and a large part of the machin- ery of the goverument as we have it in tbe Building Depart- ment, Board of Street Opening, Water Bureau, etc, etc, oper- ates directly upon real estate. Tberefore, the first to feel cor- rupt or inefflcient rule is tbe real estate owner. Moreover, in a city placed as New York is—the actual capital of tbe country— real estate may be especially beuefited by an efficient admiuis- tration of municipal aftairs. Good streets, Sne parks, for in- stance, have uot only a domestic value hut tbey act as addi- tional inducements to visitoi-s and otbers to resort to tbe city. The tendeney of people to gravitate to the ebief city of a coun- try is strong, we know, but it becoraes all tbe stronger if that city be heautiful and orderly, as it may easily be, beyoud tbe commou. Paris is a sígual example of the pecuuiary value oC fine improvements and regular good managemeut, New York cau well aft'ord to spend raoney largely upon all luaniier of bet- terments. Expenditures oí tliat uature will pay liere. as tbey wIII in no other city of tbe couutry, But tbese outlays will uot be niade, nor prudeutly could they be made, if tlie goveroment were in tlie hands of politiciaus, no luatter of what order. THERE raust be a serious uioving eause wbeu three huudred New Yorkers meet to discuss a local question, Conse- quently it raay be taken for granted that the eseitement that produeed tbe meeting on Tliuraday eyening to protest agaiust the practical conflscation of the roadway of Amsterdara avenue by the traction companies of this city was justified. This view is confirmed by an examination of the facts, tbe principal of whicb are: That with four tracks on the roadway, only a space